Plaintiffs, an entertainer and the company he founded, sued defendant company for breach of contract and other counts relating to the production of a documentary film. Defendant filed a cross-complaint. Plaintiffs filed a special motion to strike the cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16. The Los Angeles County Superior Court, California, granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Both sides appealed.
Overview
The court concluded that the gravamen of the breach of contract count in the cross-complaint was plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with their express contractual obligations, that the count did not arise from protected activity, and that the trial court properly denied plaintiffs' special motion to strike as to that count. Plaintiffs did not argue or show that the conduct alleged in the cross-complaint was in furtherance of their constitutional right of petition or free speech within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. There was no small business attorneys that an alleged failure to appear for interviews or other conduct alleged in the cross-complaint involved any written or oral statement or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public importance. The trial court properly granted the special motion to strike as to the count for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs' statements made through their attorney to defendant were made in anticipation of a lawsuit by plaintiffs against defendant and were entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Outcome
The order was affirmed.
Appellants, county and city, sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), which held that respondent church was entitled to a tax exemption and ordered taxes paid by the church to be refunded in the church's action to recover taxes paid under protest. The church appealed the trial court's order taxing costs, which did not include the costs of a deposition taken by the church.
Overview
The church claimed an exemption from city and county property taxes because its property was used "solely and exclusively for religious worship," within the meaning of Cal. Const. art. XIII, § 1 1/2. Under an objective test, the court held the church's practice of humanism, under which a belief in and reverence of God was not essential to membership, qualified as a religion for tax exemption purposes. The court held that the terms "religion" or "religious" in the tax exemption laws should not include any reference to whether the beliefs involved were theistic or nontheistic. The court found that the state had a logical and legal justification, based in the morality of its citizens, for the tax exemption. The court held that interpreting such exemption with a broad construction, allowing the exemption for theistic and nontheistic religions, did not adversely affect the constitutionality of the exemption. The court held that the church was not entitled to its costs for a deposition taken because in determining whether the taking of the deposition was "necessary," the trial court was required to make its determination from the circumstances as they appeared when it was taken.
Outcome
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the church was entitled to the refund because the church's practice of humanism constituted a religion. The court affirmed the trial court's order, which did not award costs for the church's deposition, because the deposition was not necessary.
